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I. Introduction and Summary of Conclusions

A. ISSUE

This research memorandum seeks to examine the following issue:

Appropriate Standard Of Competence For Attorneys Who
Represent Defendants Before The International Criminal Tribunal
For Rwanda.1

B. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The countries discussed, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and
South Africa, either have or are moving toward a requirement for effective attorney
assistance. The standards vary. The United States and Canada look at both attorney
competence and the validity of the trial result.2 The United Kingdom looks only to
whether there has been a miscarriage of justice and frowns upon an examination of
attorney competence.3 South African courts have yet to declare a right of effective
assistance of counsel, but experts anticipate that when the appropriate case arises, they
will recognize the right.4
Thus, a standard appropriate for adoption by the Rwanda Tribunal which would
1

See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Office of the Prosecutor, Legal Research Topic No. 10,
Facsimile dated 27 August 2000. The focus of the memorandum is based on that facsimile, which in part
asked what standard of competence should apply to attorneys representing defendants before the Tribunal,
what standards might apply and how the Office of the Prosecutor should shape its argument if the issue of
ineffective assistance is brought on appeal.

2

See infra Part V(A),(B).

3

See infra Part V(C).

4

See infra Part V(D).
1

address the fair trial concerns underlying the approach of these countries would be a
miscarriage of justice test. Although the United States and Canada look also to attorney
performance, where this performance is grossly inadequate it will follow that a
miscarriage of justice likely results. In addition, this standard is most likely to be
acceptable to countries generally which use the adversarial system. As countries such as
South Africa have not yet recognized the right to effective assistance of counsel, this
standard provides more protection for defendants than they would otherwise have in such
jurisdictions. Thus, it is a fair standard for the Tribunal to apply, but is still a very
difficult standard for the defendant to prove.
Finally, it should be noted that in assessing effective assistance of counsel,
national courts frown upon counsel conflict of interest, such as where counsel represents
two parties with conflicting defenses. Such a situation will often lead to a presumption, if
not a per se determination, of ineffective assistance of counsel. In South Africa, where
Courts have not recognized the right to effective assistance of counsel, a conflict of
interest, such as where counsel represents two parties whose defenses are mutually
exclusive, would result in automatic vitiation of the proceedings.5 In Canada, an accused
is deprived of effective assistance of counsel where one lawyer represents two defendants
who might be able to place the blame on each other.6 And in the United States, where
counsel’s conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of the defendant’s
representation, that defendant need not demonstrate prejudice to obtain relief.7

II. Factual Background
5

See Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study 354 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 1999). [Reproduced in the
Accompanying Notebook at Tab 4]
6

See id. at 77. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 4]

7

See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-350 (1980). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at
Tab 15]
2

The appropriate standard of attorney competence for defendants before the
Tribunal is anticipated to arise in the appeals of convicted war criminals.

III. Applicable Rules

There are no guidelines in the Rwanda Tribunal Statute which address the
standard for attorney competence. There is a stated right to an attorney, as well as
baseline standards for attorney qualifications. However, ensuring full respect for the
rights of the accused is considered one of the most important responsibilities of the
Rwanda Tribunal.8 To this end, it is important the Tribunal comply with international
standards of human rights.9

A. Attorney qualifications and appointment

1. Article 13

Article 13 provides that a defense attorney before the Tribunal must be admitted
to practice law or a professor of law; must speak one of the working languages of the
Tribunal, English or French; must agree to be assigned to represent a suspect or accused;
and must be included on the Registrar’s list per Art. 45(A) of the Rules.

2. Rule 45(A)

8

See 1 Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 513 (1998).
[Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 8]
9

Id. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 8]
3

Per Rule 45(A), counsel is assigned as follows:
A list of counsel who speak one or both of the working languages
of the Tribunal, meet the requirements of Rule 44 (satisfies the
Register he is admitted to practice law in a State, or is a professor
of law) and have indicated their willingness to be assigned by the
Tribunal to indigent suspects or accused, shall be kept by the
Registrar.10

B. Defendant’s right to counsel:

The accused has the right to choose counsel if the accused has means to pay for
his or her defense, and the counsel of choice has the necessary qualifications.11

1. Article 17(3)

Article 17(3) provides that if questioned, the suspect shall be entitled to be
assisted by counsel of his or her own choice, including the right to have legal assistance
assigned to the suspect without payment.

2. Article 20

Article 20 provides that the accused shall be entitled to (b) “communicate with
counsel of his or her own choosing; . . . and (d) to defend himself or herself in person or
through legal assistance of his or her own choosing; to be informed, if he or she does not
have legal assistance of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him or her, in
10

Rule 45 (amended June 1998) (John R.W.D. Jones, The Practice of International Criminal Tribunals for
the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 569 (2000)). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 5]

11

1 Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 521 (1998).
[Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 8]
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any case where the interests of justice so
require, and without payment by him or her in any such case if he or she does not have
sufficient means to pay for it.”12

C. Appeals: Article 24

Article 24 provides that “(1) The Appeals Chamber shall hear appeals [based on]
(a) An error on a question of law invalidating the decision; or (b) An error of fact which
has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.”

IV. Legislative History of the Rwanda Rules

A. The Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Systems

The Yugoslavia Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, from which the
Rwanda rules were drawn,13 were modeled in large part on a draft submitted by the
United States, which reflected an adversarial system as opposed to the inquisitorial
system used in civil law countries.14 The Yugoslavia Tribunal’s approach was also
influenced by the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Tokyo Tribunal precedents, which
followed a largely adversarial approach.15
12

Rwanda Tribunal Statute, Article 20 (1 Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, The International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, 512 (1998)). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 8]
13

See 1 Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 417 (1998).
[Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 8]

14

Michael P. Scharf, Trial and Error: An Assessment of the First Judgment of the Yugoslavia War Crimes
Tribunal, 30 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 167, 171 (1998). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at
Tab 11]
15

See 1 Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 416 (1998).
[Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 8]
5

In the adversarial system, attorneys conduct the trial, with each side a committed
advocate fighting to convince the decision maker of the correctness of his or her
position.16 The inherent hostility of the government toward the accused is openly
displayed.17
In the inquisitorial system, by contrast, “neither counsel has much of a role, if the
defendant even has counsel.”18 This is because the trial is conducted by a theoretically
neutral judge, rather than by opposing parties.19 The opposing counsel rarely even crossexamines a witness.20
There are fewer rules in place to safeguard a defendant’s rights in the inquisitorial
system because of the more significant role played by disinterested parties, the judge and
the magistrate.21 Conversely, the adversarial system sees as necessary rights for the
accused including the right to confront one’s accusers, the right against unreasonable
searches, the right to silence, and the right to counsel.22
Because the Rwanda Tribunal is based on the adversarial model, such rights
should be guaranteed to the defendants before the tribunal, including the right to counsel.
Such a right encompasses effective assistance of counsel, not just assistance of counsel.23
16

See Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study xv, xvi (Craig M. Bradley ed., 1999). [Reproduced in the
Accompanying Notebook at Tab 4]

17

See id. at xvi. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 4]

18

Id. at xv. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 4]

19

See id. at xvi. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 4]

20

See 1 Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 7 (1998).
[Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 8]
21

Michael P. Scharf, Trial and Error: An Assessment of the First Judgment of the Yugoslavia War Crimes
Tribunal, 30 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 167, 172 (1998). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at
Tab 11]

22

See Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study xvi (Craig M. Bradley ed., 1999). [Reproduced in the
Accompanying Notebook at Tab 4]

23

See Sienho Yee, The Erdemovic Sentencing Judgement, 26 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 263, 284 (1997).
[Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 12]
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As a result, ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground for appeal should likely be
recognized by the Rwanda Tribunal.24

B. The Tadic case

The Appeals Chamber held in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic25 that “the essential
characteristic of a tribunal ‘established by law’ is that it ‘genuinely afford the accused the
full guarantees of fair trial set out in Art. 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.’”26 The Covenant provides, among other rights, the right to counsel of
the accused’s choosing.27 The Yugoslavia Tribunal, on which the Rwanda Tribunal was
based, has also attributed particular importance to European regional and human rights
standards.28

V. Standards for Attorney Effectiveness in Common Law Countries

24

See id. (argument that ineffective assistance of counsel should be ground for post-conviction relief at the
Yugoslavia Tribunal). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 12]

25

Case No. IT-94-1-AR72.

26

Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, 1 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 514 (1998)
[Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 8]. Article 14 of the Covenant provides in part that
the accused shall be entitled to communicate with counsel of his own choosing, to defend himself in person
or through legal counsel of his choosing; to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the
interests of justice so require; and to examine, or have examined, witnesses against him. See Basic
Documents Supplement to International Law 156 (Henkin et al. eds., 1993). [Reproduced in the
Accompanying Notebook at Tab 2]

27

Article 14 of the Covenant provides in part that the accused shall be entitled to communicate with counsel
of his own choosing, to defend himself in person or through legal counsel of his choosing; to have legal
assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require; and to examine, or have
examined, witnesses against him. See Basic Documents Supplement to International Law 156 (Henkin, et
al., eds., 1993). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 2]

28

See Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, 1 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 514 (1998).
[Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 8]
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A. The United States

1. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel

In the United States, the right to counsel is guaranteed in the Sixth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, which provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”29
This right has been interpreted to include the obligation of the state to provide
defense counsel for the indigent.30 The selection of such appointed counsel is a matter at
the absolute discretion of the trial court, assuming that such appointed counsel is
competent.31

2. Ineffective assistance claims based on lawyer incompetence

Setting the standard: Strickland v. Washington32
The U.S. Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington established the standard for
attorney competence, noting that “the right to counsel is the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.”33 The Court held that to establish ineffective assistance requiring

29

Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure 519 (2d ed. 1992). [Reproduced in the
Accompanying Notebook at Tab 9]

30

See id. at 519. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 9]

31

See id. at 546-47. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 9]

32

466 U.S. 668 (1984). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

33

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771
n.14) (emphasis added). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]
8

reversal of a conviction, “a defendant must show both (i) that ‘counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as “counsel” guaranteed . . . by the Sixth
Amendment,’ and (ii) that ‘counsel made errors so serious that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.”34 Canada has also adopted this standard.35
The standard for measuring performance is that of “reasonably effective
assistance” as guided by “prevailing professional norms” and consideration of “all
circumstances” relevant to the attorney’s performance.36 More specific guidelines in
applying the standard were considered inappropriate.37
The standard for measuring prejudice is whether there is a “reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would be
different.”38
The defendant David Leroy Washington committed crimes including “three brutal
stabbing murders, torture, kidnapping, severe assaults, attempted murders, attempted
extortion, and theft”39 during a 10-day period in September 1976. He subsequently
surrendered to police and gave a lengthy confession to the third murder.40
Washington was sentenced to death on each of the three counts of murder.41 He

34

See Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure 585 (2d ed. 1992). [Reproduced in the
Accompanying Notebook at Tab 9]

35

See R. v. G.D.B. [2000] S.C.J. 22 [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 33]. See also
supra Part B.
36

See Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure 585 (2d ed. 1992). [Reproduced in the
Accompanying Notebook at Tab 9]

37

See id. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 9]

38

Id. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 9]

39

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 672 (1984). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab
26]

40

See id. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

41

See id. at 675. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]
9

appealed on numerous grounds, including ineffective assistance of counsel at the
sentencing hearing.42
Washington’s counsel, an experienced criminal lawyer, actively pursued pretrial
motions and discovery.43 He cut his efforts short, however, after experiencing a sense of
“hopelessness” about the case when he learned that Washington, against his advice, had
confessed to the first two murders.44 Washington subsequently waived his right to a jury
trial, and pleaded guilty to all of the numerous charges against him, again against his
counsel’s advice.45
In his plea, Washington told the trial judge that he had no significant prior
criminal record before this spree, and that at the time of the spree he was under extreme
stress due to his inability to support his family.46 He also stated that he accepted
responsibility for the crimes.47 The judge responded that he had “a great deal of respect
for people who are willing to step forward and admit their responsibility” but that he was
making no statement about his sentencing decision.48
Washington’s counsel advised him to invoke his right under Florida law for an
advisory jury at the sentencing hearing.49 Again rejecting his counsel’s advice,

42

See id. A capital sentencing proceeding such as this one, as opposed to an ordinary sentencing, was held
to be sufficiently like a trial that counsel’s duties would be similar. See id. at 686-687. [Reproduced in the
Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

43

See id. at 672. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

44

See id. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

45

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 672 (1984). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at
Tab 26]

46

See id. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

47

See id. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

48

Id. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

49

See id. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]
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Washington waived this right and chose to be sentenced by the trial judge alone.50
In preparation for the sentencing hearing, Washington’s counsel spoke with
Washington about his background, and also spoke by telephone with his wife and mother,
although he did not follow up on an unsuccessful effort to meet with them.51 He did not
seek out other character witnesses, nor did he request a psychiatric examination, since he
had no indication that his client had psychological problems.52
Counsel in his judgment decided not to look for further evidence concerning
Washington’s character and emotional state, a decision which reflected his sense of
hopelessness about overcoming the effect of Washington’s confessions and the gruesome
nature of the crimes.53 These decisions were also based on his judgment that it was
advisable to rely on Washington’s plea for evidence about his background and level of
stress.54 By so doing, counsel prevented the State from cross-examining Washington and
from putting on its own psychiatric evidence.55
Counsel was also able to exclude other evidence which was potentially harmful to
Washington, including his “rap sheet” and presentence report, which included
Washington’s criminal history that would have demonstrated the falsity of the claim in
his plea of no significant criminal history.56 Thus, counsel’s strategy at the sentencing
hearing was based on the trial judge’s remarks at the plea colloquy, as well as his
reputation as a judge who found it important for defendants to admit responsibility for
50

See id. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

51

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 672-673 (1984). [Reproduced in the Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 26]

52

See id. at 673. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

53

See id. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

54

See id. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

55

See id. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

56

See id. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]
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their actions.57
Counsel argued that Washington’s acceptance of responsibility and remorse
should prevent him from receiving the death penalty.58 He also argued that Washington
had no criminal history and had committed the crimes under extreme mental or emotional
disturbance, both mitigating circumstances.59 He did not cross-examine the medical
examiner about the manner of death of Washington’s victims.60
In sentencing Washington to death, the trial judge found that aggravating
circumstances such as the gruesomeness of the crimes, Washington’s pattern of stealing
during this crime spree, that all three murders were committed to avoid arrest for the
accompanying crimes, and that Washington did not suffer from an emotional or mental
disturbance, were not outweighed by mitigating circumstances.61
Washington appealed, and the Supreme Court applied the two-part test asking: (1)
whether counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) if so, whether the deficiency
prejudiced the defense.62
As to the first question, the Court held that the proper standard for attorney
performance is that of “reasonably effective assistance,”63 with more specific guidelines
57

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 673 (1984). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at
Tab 26]

58

See id. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

59

See id. at 673-674. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

60

See id. at 674. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

61

See id. at 674-675. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

62

See id. at 687 [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]. Prejudice is presumed where
there is actual or constructive denial of assistance of counsel, or state interference with counsel’s assistance.
See id. at 692. A more limited presumption of prejudice is applied where counsel has a conflict of interest.
See id. See also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986). [Reproduced in the Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 20]

63

For cases applying the reasonableness standard, see Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-267 (1973)
(counsel’s failure to evaluate facts giving rise to constitutional claim, or failure to inform himself of facts
which might have shown the existence of such claim, might in certain situations indicate incompetence of
counsel) [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 27]; Kimmelman v. Morrison; Burger v.
12

not appropriate.64 This requirement comes from counsel’s duty to advocate for the
defendant’s cause, and to ensure that the trial is a reliable adversarial process.65
Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance is “highly deferential” with a “strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.”66 The Court noted that fairness dictates making every effort to “eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight,” and further
that “[e]ven the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the
same way.”67
Thus the Court promulgated a flexible standard for what constitutes an effective
attorney. The reason for this is indicated in part by the Court’s stated concern that it not
encourage a “proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges”; that counsel’s performance and
willingness to serve would be affected, and that intense scrutiny would impair the ardor
and independence of defense counsel, and undermine the trust between attorney and
client.68
Applied to this case, the Court held that Washington failed to prove the

Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 784, 794-795 (1987) (decision to forgo lesser culpability argument had sound
strategic basis where Court opined that the defendant’s actions were “outrageously and wantonly vile and
inhuman”; failure to develop and present mitigating evidence supported by reasonable professional
judgment that explanation of petitioner’s history would not have minimized risk of death penalty)
[Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 20]; Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536 (1986)
(failure to pursue objection to admission of evidence fell within wide range of professionally competent
assistance) [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 24]; Nix v. Whiteside, 457 U.S. 157, 171
(counsel’s refusal to offer perjured testimony falls within range of reasonable professional conduct)
[Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 22].
64

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at
Tab 26]

65

See id. at 688. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

66

Id. at 689. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

67

Id. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

68

See id. at 690. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]
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ineffectiveness component of his claim.69 It based this conclusion on the assessment that
counsel’s decisions were based on strategy and fell within the range of professionally
reasonable judgments.70 The Court also noted that nothing in the record indicated that
counsel’s “understandabl[e]” hopelessness affected his professional judgment.71
As to the second question (whether counsel’s performance prejudiced the case
against the defendant), the Court found the lack of merit in this component “even more
stark.”72 The evidence Washington claimed his counsel should have offered at his
sentencing hearing, regarding his character and mental condition, “would barely have
altered the sentencing profile presented.”73 The admission of such evidence would have
shown that numerous people who knew Washington thought he was a good person, but
likely would not outweigh the aggravating circumstances noted by the judge.74 Further,
admission of certain information, such as the rap sheet and psychological report, might
have been harmful to Washington’s case.75
After consideration and denial of both components, deficient performance and
prejudice, the Court noted more generally that there was no showing that the justice of
Washington’s sentence was rendered unreliable by a breakdown in the adversary
process.76
69
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See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 699 (1984). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at
Tab 26]

71

See id. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

72

Id. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

73

Id. at 700. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

74

See id. (no reasonable probability omitted evidence would have changed conclusion). [Reproduced in the
Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

75

See id. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 26]

76

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 700 (1984). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab
26]
14

3. Applying the Rule in the United States77

i. Generally
Counsel’s competence is presumed, whether counsel is retained by the accused or
court-appointed.78 The defendant has the burden to rebut this heavy presumption.79
The right to effective assistance of counsel is generally not violated where the
counsel’s actions are the result of an exercise of discretion regarding tactics or strategy.80
“Strategic choices made after a thorough investigation of the law and facts relevant to
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.”81 However, it has been held that where
counsel has reason to doubt a defendant’s competency to stand trial he must raise the
issue, despite considerations of strategy and tactics.82

ii. Discovery and investigation
Counsel’s representation was found to be ineffective in Kimmelman v.
Morrison83, where counsel failed to timely move for suppression of certain evidence,
which was due to his failure to conduct adequate pretrial discovery.84
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Neil Morrison was convicted of raping a 15-year-old girl in his apartment.85 At
trial, the State called as a witness Detective Dolores Most, one of the officers who
investigated the rape complaint.86 Most stated that she accompanied the victim back to
Morrison’s apartment, where a neighbor let them in.87 While there, she took a sheet from
Morrison’s bed.88
At this point, Morrison’s counsel objected to the introduction of the sheet and any
testimony concerning it, as it had been seized without a warrant.89 New Jersey Court
Rules, however, required suppression motions be made within 30 days of indictment,
unless extended by the trial court for good cause.90 Morrison’s counsel explained that he
had not heard of the seizure until the day before.91 The prosecutor responded that the
defense counsel, who had been on the case from the beginning, never asked for any
discovery.92 Had he done so, the prosecutor stated, police reports would have revealed
the search and seizure.93 In addition, the prosecutor had sent defense counsel a copy of
the laboratory report concerning tests conducted on the sheet one month before trial.94
The defense counsel asserted that it was the State’s obligation to inform him of
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See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 368 (1986). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at
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the case against his client, even though he had not made a discovery request.95 The judge
rejected this assertion, telling counsel that he was remiss.96 The judge further stated that
the basis for suppression was “very valid,” but that he would not consider it in the middle
of trial.97
The evidence against the defendant as a result of the admission of the sheet was
damaging, as it confirmed that stains on the defendant’s sheet matched stains on the
victim’s underwear, and that hairs recovered from the sheet was similar to both the
defendant and the victim.98
The U.S. Supreme Court held that failure to file a suppression motion does not
constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel.99 However, applying a “heavy measure
of deference” to counsel’s judgment, the Court found counsel’s failure to conduct any
pretrial discovery unreasonable, and contrary to prevailing professional norms.100 The
Court also noted that the counsel’s justification for failing to conduct discovery betrayed
either a “startling ignorance of the law -- or a weak attempt to shift blame for inadequate
preparation.”101
Having established the first prong of the test, that counsel’s performance was
deficient, the Court remanded the case for a determination of the second prong,
prejudice.102
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In the following cases, the Supreme Court directly or indirectly held that
counsel’s representation was not ineffective by his alleged failure to investigate.

The Court in United States v. Agurs103 observed that counsel’s failure to obtain the
victim’s record, due to his belief that it was inadmissible, did not constitute ineffective
representation. The Court noted that the trial judge had considered the record, and that it
did not change the judge’s conviction that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.104
The Court in Hill v. Lockhart,105 observed that in a case where the issue is whether
counsel’s failure to discover potentially exculpatory evidence prejudiced the defendant by
causing him to plead guilty, the ineffectiveness determination depends on the likelihood
that the evidence would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea,
which in turn would depend largely on whether the evidence would have been likely to
change the outcome of the trial.106

iii. Pleading
To succeed on an appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel in connection
with a guilty plea, the defendant must show that counsel’s advice was not within the
range of competence demanded of criminal attorneys, and that there is a reasonable
probability he otherwise would have not pleaded guilty.107 However, while counsel may
advise his client whether to plead guilty or go to trial, counsel’s failure to make a
103

427 U.S. 97 (1976). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 28]
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See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 114 (1976). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at
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474 U.S. 52 (1985). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 19]
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recommendation does not necessarily constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.108 The
test is whether counsel’s assistance allowed the client to make an informed and voluntary
choice.
In the following decisions, guilty pleas were held not to be involuntary by reason
of ineffective assistance of counsel.
In Hill v. Lockhart,109 the Court applied the Strickland standard to determine
whether counsel’s assistance was ineffective during the plea process as a result of his
failure to inform the defendant of his eligibility for parole.110 The Court observed that
“the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”111
The Court held that the District Court did not err in its decision not to hold a hearing on
the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as Petitioner did not allege in his
habeas corpus petition that, had counsel correctly informed him about his parole
eligibility date, he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted on going to trial.112
The U.S. Supreme Court held in McMann v. Richardson113 that the fact that a
confession might be subsequently held inadmissible does not justify a conclusion that
defense counsel was ineffective or incompetent because he thought the confession would
probably be admissible and thus advised his client to plead guilty.114
Richardson alleged that his plea of guilty to murder was induced by a coerced
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confession because he was beaten up, and by ineffective counsel.115 Richardson’s
assigned attorney conferred with him 10 minutes prior to the day the plea of guilty was
taken.116 He advised his attorney that he did not want to plead guilty to something he did
not do, and was told to plead guilty to avoid the electric chair.117
The Court held that whether counsel’s advice was effective depended not on
whether it is retrospectively right or wrong, but whether it was within the range of
competence for attorneys in criminal cases.118
In Tollett v. Henderson,119 the Court held that where a defendant has solemnly
admitted his guilt in open court, he may not subsequently raise claims relating to the
deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea, but
may only attack the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea by showing the advice he
received from counsel was not competent.120 It is not sufficient to show that the defendant
was not advised of every conceivable constitutional plea that might have been raised, or
that a factual inquiry that might have been made would have uncovered a possible
constitutional infirmity in the proceedings.121
The Court held in United States v. Cronic,122 that even where there is a bona fide
defense, counsel may advise his client to plead guilty if that advice falls within the range
115

See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 763 (1970). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at
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of reasonable competence under the circumstances.123

iv. Argument
In the following case, a defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel was
not violated with regard to his attorney’s opening statement.
In United States v. Cronic,124 the U.S. Supreme Court held that counsel’s decision
to use notes during his opening statement, and his statement to the jury that this was his
first trial, did not justify a presumption that the trial was unfair and in fact may have been
a strategical decision.125

v. Introduction of Evidence
In the following U.S. Supreme Court cases, counsel’s failure or refusal to
introduce certain evidence did not violate the defendants’ right to effective assistance of
counsel.126
The Court in Nix v. Whiteside127 held that the refusal of counsel to cooperate with
the defendant’s intent to give perjured testimony did not constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel. The attorney had acted according to professional standards and the defendant
could not, as a matter of law, be considered prejudiced by having to present truthful
testimony.128
Whiteside was convicted of second-degree murder.129 He and two others went to
123
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the victim, Calvin Love’s apartment seeking marihuana late one night, and an argument
ensued.130 Love, who was in bed, told his girlfriend to get his “piece” and then started to
reach under his pillow and move toward Whiteside.131 Whiteside fatally stabbed him in
the chest.132
Whiteside consistently told his attorney that although he had not seen a gun in
Love’s hand, he was convinced that Love had one.133 Whiteside’s counsel advised him
that the existence of a gun was not necessary to establish a claim of self-defense, but only
a reasonable belief that the victim had a gun nearby.134
About a week before his trial, Whiteside told his attorney that he had seen
something “metallic” in Love’s hand.135 Asked about this, Whiteside said that “[i]f I
don’t say I saw a gun, I’m dead.”136
Whiteside’s counsel told Whiteside such testimony would be perjury, and told
him that he could not allow him to testify falsely, because that would be suborning
perjury.137 Whiteside testified at trial that he had not seen a gun and was convicted; he
moved for a new trial based on counsel’s refusal to allow him to testify that he had seen a
gun.138
22]
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The Supreme Court analyzed the duty of an attorney when confronted with a
client’s intention to testify falsely, and found that counsel’s response adhered to
reasonable professional standards. 139 The Court further found that Whiteside’s truthful
testimony could not have prejudiced his trial.140
In Darden v. Wainwright,141 the defendant was sentenced to death after his
conviction for murder, robbery and assault with intent to kill.142 He contended that he
was denied effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of the trial, arguing
that his counsel did not delve sufficiently into his background, and thus did not present
mitigating evidence.143 Applying the Strickland test, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the public defender’s decision not to introduce certain mitigating evidence was sound
trial strategy, and thus the defendant’s argument failed the first prong of the test dealing
with counsel’s performance.144 The Court noted that any effort to portray the defendant
as nonviolent would have allowed the prosecution to rebut with evidence of his past
convictions; any attempt to portray that the defendant was incapable of committing the
crimes would have been rebutted with a psychiatric report to the contrary; and an effort to
portray the defendant as a family man would have been met with evidence of a
girlfriend.145

vi. Suppression of evidence
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Failure to file a motion to suppress evidence does not constitute per se ineffective
assistance of counsel, but may constitute ineffective assistance under certain
circumstances.146
In Kimmelman v. Morrison,147 supra at Part A(3)(i), counsel’s conduct with regard
to suppression of evidence that was allegedly illegally obtained was held so
professionally deficient as to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.148 Counsel’s
failure to suppress evidence was due to his ignorance of the illegal search, based on his
mistaken belief that the prosecution was obliged to disclosure all inculpatory evidence on
its own initiative.149
In Chambers v. Maroney,150 the petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus from his
robbery conviction, contending that his attorney’s appearance a few minutes before trial
was so belated as to render his assistance ineffective.151 Specifically, the petitioner
argued that counsel’s efforts to exclude from evidence guns and ammunition were
ineffective.152 The Supreme Court held the claim of prejudice was without substantial
basis, upholding the judgment of the Court of Appeals that admission of bullets was
harmless error, and that the guns were admissible evidence.153
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24

vii. Conflict of Interest and other Presumptions of Prejudice
Counsel is presumed to be competent, but prejudice will be presumed in certain
circumstances.154 The U.S. Supreme Court in the following cases held that counsel’s
assistance may be ineffective where counsel represents other parties, such as
codefendants, whose interests conflict with the defendant’s.155
In Cuyler v. Sullivan,156 defendant John Sullivan and two companions were
indicted for the shooting deaths of two victims.157 Sullivan initially had his own lawyer,
but subsequently accepted representation from the two lawyers representing the other
defendants because he could not afford to pay his own lawyer.158 Sullivan at no time
objected to the multiple representation.159
Where a defendant raised no objection at trial that a conflict existed, to show ineffective
assistance of counsel the defendant must demonstrate that an “actual conflict of interest
adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.”160 An example of such adverse effect was
shown in Glasser v. United States,161 where defense counsel failed to cross-examine a
prosecution witness as a result of his desire to diminish the jury’s perception of a
codefendant’s guilt.162 Conversely, in Dukes v. Warden,163 counsel who sought leniency
154
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for codefendants by arguing that their cooperation with police led the defendant in
question to plead guilty was held not to be ineffective, where nothing in the record
indicated the alleged conflict did in fact render the guilty plea involuntary and
unintelligent.164
In the instant case, Cuyler v. Sullivan,165 the Court noted that a defendant who
shows a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not
demonstrate prejudice to obtain relief.166 But such a defendant must show that his counsel
actively represented conflicting interests.167 Sullivan’s contention that the multiple
representation involved a possible conflict of interest was insufficient to demonstrate a
violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel, absent a showing that counsel’s
performance was actually affected.168
In Wood v. Georgia,169 the Court held that where defense counsel hired and paid
for by the defendant’s employer is influenced in his basis strategic decisions by that
employer, the due process rights of the defendant are not upheld.170
In addition to conflict of interest, the United States v. Cronic171 Court held that
prejudice will be presumed in the following circumstances: “where [the] accused is
Tab 15]
163

406 U.S. 250 (1972). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 17]

164

See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349 (1980). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab
15]
165

446 U.S. 335 (1980). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 15]

166

See id. at 349-350. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 15]

167

See id. at 350. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 15]

168

See id. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 15]

169

450 U.S. 261 (1981). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 30]

170

See 83 L.Ed. 1112, 1143 (1987). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 6]

171

466 U.S. 648 (1984). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook at Tab 29]
26

completely denied counsel at [a] critical stage of [the] proceeding; where counsel fails to
subject [the] prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing; and where surrounding
circumstances may justify [a] presumption of ineffectiveness without [inquiring] into
counsel’s actual performance at trial.”172

B. Canada

Litigation over ineffective assistance of counsel in Canada is still in an
“embryonic stage” but is anticipated to increase.173 The right to effective assistance of
counsel derives from common law, § 650(3) of the Criminal Code of Canada and §§ 7
and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.174 An accused’s right to
effective assistance of counsel is violated in Canada if it is “negligent and results in
reasonable probability of a miscarriage of justice.”175
As in the United States, a lawyer with a conflict of interest has been held to
deprive the accused of effective assistance of counsel.176 As did a lawyer who failed to
investigate witnesses’ supporting the accused’s alibi.177 The Canadian Courts have
referenced the United States’ Strickland178 standard in deciding its own appeals based on
172
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counsel’s incompetence.179

1. Standard per R. v. G.D.B. 180

Citing Strickland, the Court in R. v. G.D.B. 181 noted that for an ineffective
assistance of counsel appeal to succeed the counsel’s acts or omissions must constitute
incompetence, and a miscarriage of justice must have resulted.182
Incompetence is based on a reasonableness standard, with the burden on the
appellant to establish that counsel’s conduct was not the result of reasonable professional
judgment, with hindsight playing no part in the assessment.183 A miscarriage of justice
constitutes a procedural unfairness or a compromise of the trial’s reliability.184
Veering slightly from the Strickland Court’s approach, however, the Court here
noted that where there is no prejudice, it is “undesirable” for courts to consider the
performance component.185
In R. v. G.D.B., the appellant was convicted of the sexual and indecent assault of
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his adopted daughter.186 At issue in the appeal was counsel’s decision not to introduce
into evidence a tape on which the daughter, J.W., denied to her mother, M.B., that she
had been sexually assaulted by the appellant.187 Instead, counsel raised questions about
the content of the tape during cross-examination of J.W., who did not know the tape
existed.188
In applying these facts to the Strickland standard, the Court asked whether it was
appropriate that the decision not to use the tape was made solely by defendant’s counsel
and, if not, what was the result of the defendant being excluded from the decision.189
Counsel’s decision not to use the tape was based on the fact that the
complainant’s mother asked leading questions and secretly taped the conversation,
actions which counsel feared would destroy the mother’s credibility.190 As she was the
defense’s main witness, this would force counsel to put the appellant, whom counsel
considered a poor witness, on the stand.191
The Court held that where counsel makes a decision in good faith and in the best
interests of his client, as here, a court should not question it except to prevent a
miscarriage of justice.192 In some situations, such as decisions whether or not to plead
guilty, or whether to testify, defense counsel must consult with the defendant, and failure
to do so may in some circumstances result in a miscarriage of justice.193 This is not such
186
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a case, as counsel had the “implied authority to make tactical decisions.”194 Failure to
consult with the defendant for instructions regarding the tape’s use did not affect the
outcome of the trial -- there was no miscarriage of justice.195

2. Applying the Rule in Canada

i. R v. Petitpas196
The respondent Petitpas while driving was stopped by a police officer, who
noticed a smell of alcohol.197 The officer asked Petitpas to take a roadside test, which he
failed.198 Petitpas was then taken to the police department to be
given a breathalyzer test, at which time he called his lawyer.199 His lawyer advised him
not to take the test (or “not to blow”).200
Petitpas argued at trial that this advice was incorrect and that he should not have
been instructed to refuse the test; that counsel’s advice amounted to no advice.201 The
trial judge ruled that the advice not to take the test amounted to “no advice.”
Although this was an argument of counsel’s incompetence prior to trial, rather
than during a trial or a capital sentencing hearing as in Strickland, the appeals Court in
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the instant case applied the Strickland standard. The Court held that there was not
enough evidence to support the trial judge’s decision. The Court held that counsel’s
advice to his client to not take the breathalyzer test could have been wrong, but that it did
not meet the standard enunciated in R v. G.D.B. Because the appeals court felt, however,
that there was a potential for miscarriage of justice, and that the trial judge did not
sufficiently state his reasons, the case was remanded for a new trial.
Thus this case suggests that in Canada, faulty advice prior to trial may constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel justifying an appeal.

ii. R. v. Rodgers202
The appellant Rodgers alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for four failures
on the part of counsel to bring out evidence, in an effort to have that fresh evidence
considered.203 The Court held that the suggested fresh evidence would not have resulted
in a different verdict and did not demonstrate a miscarriage of justice.204
In the first alleged error, Rodgers claimed that counsel should have pointed blame
to another suspect.205 The Court opined that this suggested strategy would have been
problematic, as it would have opened the door to the defendant’s record for sexual
interference and a psychological assessment labeling him a psychopathic deviant.206
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Second, Rodgers contended that counsel proceeded to trial without full disclosure,
by failing to interview defense witnesses prior to giving a list of such witnesses to the
Crown (by which Crown learned of two witnesses whose testimony was unhelpful to the
defense).207 The Court noted that in fact, the police already knew the names of these
witnesses because Rodgers, contrary to counsel’s advice, made a statement to the police
in which he gave their names.208

Third, Rodgers claimed that counsel failed to sufficiently prepare the defense
witnesses.209 The Court found, based on cross-examination of these witnesses on
Rodger’s application to admit fresh evidence, that further preparation by trial counsel
would have yielded evidence that was detrimental to Rodgers’ case.210
Finally, Rodgers claimed that consciousness of his innocence should have been
brought out more fully, a suggestion the Court found to be a rehash of evidence already
before the jury and of minimal assistance to his defense.211
In sum, the Court rejected each of Rodgers’ claims that his counsel was
ineffective either because the suggested evidence would have harmed him more than
helped him, or would have had no effect at all, and thus could not result in a different
verdict or a miscarriage of justice.

C. The United Kingdom
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The United Kingdom, though it follows an adversarial or common law system,
generally does not allow ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground for appeal.212
Incompetent representation in a magistrate court may be remedied by competent
representation in a rehearing to the Crown Court.213 While a decision may be quashed
where the court refused an adjournment allowing counsel adequate time to prepare his
case, generally the defendant may not argue that his own counsel’s conduct made the
proceedings unfair.214
A Full Bench decision in Scotland, HMA v. Anderson, 215 reviewed the law in the
United Kingdom and elsewhere to answer the question of whether alleged incompetency
of counsel could be grounds for an appeal.216 HMA v. Anderson is seen as a particularly
important case because a full bench, necessary to overrule a previous appeal court
precedent, only occurs four or five times a decade.217
The decision overturned previous cases218 which held that even if the conduct of
counsel deprives the accused of the right to a fair trial, the court cannot interfere on the
ground that there was a miscarriage of justice.219 The Anderson v. HMA Court said that
“if the system breaks down to such an extent that the defence is not presented, it would be
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a denial of justice for the court not to intervene in order to set aside the conviction and
allow a new trial.”220
The new standard promulgated by the Court looks to whether counsel’s conduct
deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial, such that a miscarriage of justice
results.221 For instance, this may occur where the accused was deprived of the
opportunity to present his defense, or where his counsel acted contrary to his
instructions.222 However, the Court was clear in saying that while counsel must act
according to the accused’s instruction as to what the defense is, it is to counsel’s own
discretion as to how he conducts that defense.223
Thus Scotland has a stricter standard, looking only at what the United States
would consider the second part of a two-prong test: whether a miscarriage of justice
results. This is also the primary consideration in Canada, which does not address
attorney competency if the outcome of the trial would not have been changed. However,
whether a miscarriage would result necessary requires a look at counsel’s actions in
representing the accused.
In Anderson v. HMA, the appellant was convicted of forcing his way into a home
and assaulting Patrick Hugh McHugh, Sr., and his wife and three children. Anderson
appealed his conviction, saying that he was misrepresented by his solicitor advocate.224
Anderson stated that tactics for his defense which were agreed to were ignored
and changed by counsel without his agreement or consultation.225 Specifically, he felt it
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imperative that McHugh’s character be brought out at trial, including his criminal
record.226 The Court held that the solicitor advocate was “fully justified” in his decision
not to attack the character of McHugh, especially considering that Anderson was
incorrect about his criminal record, that rather than a recent prison sentence McHugh
spent a short time in prison over fifteen years earlier.227
Because putting McHugh’s character on trial would have resulted in Anderson’s
character also being put into evidence, the Court found that the solicitor advocate
“exercised a wise discretion in not putting Mr. McHugh’s character in issue.”228 The
Court found that the conduct of the solicitor advocate
“fell far short” of depriving Anderson of a fair trial.229 The Court thus refused the
appeal.230
In setting the standard for appeals based on attorney ineffectiveness, the Anderson
v. HMA Court looked to the position taken by other countries. In general, the Court
noted that England,231 New Zealand, the United States,232 Canada and Australia take the
position that if the right to fair trial is denied by incompetency or some other failure of
counsel, the court should intervene on the ground of miscarriage of justice.233 In South
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Africa, the Court noted, the law is “still in a state of uncertainty on this point.”234
Scotland certainly is more forceful than the United States or Canada, perhaps, in
its position that the manner in which counsel presents the defense should not be
criticized.235 Only where the accused has been deprived of his defense may it be found
that a miscarriage of justice occurred.236

D. South Africa

South African Courts have not decided whether the right to counsel includes the
right to effective assistance of counsel.237 However, experts in South African law
anticipate that courts would reach this finding given the appropriate case.238
The South African Bill of Rights provides the right to a fair trial, and other
guarantees essential in an adversarial system, such as presumption of innocence and the
right to remain silent.239 While the form of trial is based on the adversarial system, there
are significant inquisitorial-type procedures.240 These include judicial interrogation at the
plea stage, and the ability of the presiding officer in any trial concerning a “special
offense” to question the accused who pleads not guilty, and draw unfavorable inferences
234
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from a failure to answer.241
The defendant’s right to a fair trial includes “the right ‘to have a legal practitioner
assigned by the state and at state expense, if substantial justice would otherwise result,
and to be informed of this right promptly.’”242 Where the accused’s right to legal
representation is compromised, the proceedings have been set aside based on the idea that
a failure of justice has occurred.243
Similar to other jurisdictions, South African Courts frown upon situations where
counsel has a conflict of interest, such as where counsel represents two defendants whose
defenses were mutually exclusive.244 Such a situation would result in automatic vitiation
of the proceedings.245
While the law is still in a state of uncertainty as to whether an accused may appeal
based on ineffective assistance of counsel,246 the Court in S v. Bennett247 held that where
an accused fails to take any steps to terminate his counsel’s mandate at trial and also
expressed no dissatisfaction with his counsel’s conduct, he is not entitled to appeal on the
ground that his counsel had been negligent.248 Thus, the case suggests that in some
situations, an accused would be able to appeal based on attorney incompetence.
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